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UNMUDDYING THE WATERS:
EVALUATING THE LEGAL BASIS OF THE
HUMAN RIGHT TO WATER UNDER TREATY
LAW, CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW,
AND THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF LAW
Ndjodi Ndeunyema ∗

I. Introduction
Water scarcity, insecurity, and inequality are increasingly recognized as
1
universal concerns. The annual World Economic Forum’s Global Risk
2
Report has identified water crises as among the top five risks facing the
planet for eight consecutive years. Water crises remain entrenched among a
cluster of other risks that are rated as having both a very high likelihood and
a very high impact. Access to water is therefore more than just a concern for
the Global South and developing countries; it is a universal challenge for all
states, including the Global North and developed countries. Accordingly,
Goal 6 of the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals challenges
states to “ensure availability and sustainable management of water . . . for
3
all” by 2020, while appreciating that water challenges manifest differently
in different geographies and situations.
In this context, it is unsurprising that legal arguments that assert a
binding right to water in both the domestic and international spheres have
garnered significant attention. This article continues in that vein, assessing
*
DPhil in Law Candidate (University of Oxford); MPhil in Law, BCL, MSc
Criminology (University of Oxford); LLB, B.Juris (University of Namibia). This article was
initially presented as a conference paper at Michigan Law’s Fifth Annual Junior Scholars
Conference in 2019, and the author is grateful to the Conference participants for their helpful
feedback. This article has also benefited immensely from the input of Sandy Fredman and
colleagues from the Human Rights Research Group at Oxford University, namely Jason
Brickhill, Rishika Sahgal, Max Harris, Victoria Miyandazi, Meghan Campbell, Nomfundo
Ramalekana, Tristan Cummings, Gauri Pillai, Richard Martin, Andrew Byrnes and Helen
Taylor, as well as Maria Gwynn, Gita Keshava, and Dunia Zongwe. The author can be
contacted at ndjodi@gmail.com.
1.
Illustratively, in 2017, water scarcity already affected four out of every ten people,
while 2.1 billion people lacked access to safely managed drinking water services. See Water,
UNITED NATIONS, https://www.un.org/en/sections/issues-depth/water (last visited May 9,
2019).
2.
World Economic Forum, The Global Risks Report, at 5 (14th ed. 2009),
http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_Global_Risks_Report_2019.pdf (last visited Nov. 8,
2019).
3.
Transforming Our World: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, UNITED
NATIONS, https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/sdg6 (last visited Apr. 20, 2019).
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the existence of a legally binding right to water (that is, a human right to
4
access to clean and potable water for personal and domestic use) by
drawing on each of the three principal sources of international law: treaties,
customary international law (“CIL”), and the general principles of law.
In Part II, I argue that the right has largely already been recognized in
international human rights treaty law, even if only implicitly. First, through
adoption of its 2002 General Comment 15, the UN Committee on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights implied the right to water into article
5
11 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,
although there is some scholarly disagreement as to the normative suitability
of creating an implied right. Second, other treaties contain express right to
water provisions, although these treaties are of limited applicability, as they
have fewer contracting parties and are designed to only extend to specific
categories of protected people.
Part III considers an alternative approach: The right to water as a matter
of customary international law. This approach is appealing as norms of
customary international law bind all states, including states that are not
parties to those limited-purpose treaties that explicitly incorporate a right to
water. Further, as CIL, the right to water could be asserted by states in
investor-state dispute settlement (“ISDS”) contexts where water-related
investments have harmed local access to water. Unfortunately, even though
political bodies of the UN, particularly the UN General Assembly
(“UNGA”) in its 2010 Resolution 64/292, have “recognised” the right to
water, establishing the crystallization of the right as a CIL norm is
challenging. While there is strong evidence of opinio juris, evidence of state
practice is sparser. Consequently, this article assesses the presence of CIL in
support of a right to water under two different methodologies—the “sliding
scale approach” and the “reflective equilibrium approach”—and finds the
evidence of state practice inadequate to support a new CIL norm.
Part IV then evaluates whether the right to water has become part of the
corpus of binding international law through “the general principles of law
recognized by civilized nations” and finds that there is no independent legal
basis for the right to water as a matter of general principle. Part V concludes
the article.

4.
See Potable, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2017) (defining potable as “fit or
suitable for drinking”).
5.
UN Econ. & Soc. Council, Comm. on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,
General Comment 15: The Right to Water (arts. 11 and 12 of the Covenant), ¶¶ 3–4, U.N.
Doc. E/C.12/2002/11 (2002); see also Human Rights Council, Rep. of the U.N. High
Commissioner for Human Rights on the Scope and Content of the Relevant Human Rights
Obligations Related to Equitable Access to Safe Drinking Water and Sanitation Under
International Human Rights Instruments, ¶ (e), U.N. Doc. A/HRC/6/3 (Aug. 16, 2007);
Human Rights Council, Rep. of the Independent Expert on the Issue of Human Rights
Obligations Related to Access to Safe Drinking Water and Sanitation, Catarina de
Albuquerque, ¶ 16, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/15/31 (June 29, 2010).
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II. Evaluating a Treaty-based Right to Water
International civil society and intergovernmental organizations have
advocated for a universal convention specifically dedicated to the right to
6
clean water for over a decade. However, at this time, there exists no
independent, issue-specific treaty that proclaims an express, circumstanceindependent right to water from a strictly anthropocentric perspective, and
that outlines the right’s normative content; and determines the obligations of
States Parties in respect to the right. For our purposes, an express right to
water is to be understood as one that is textually specified in a treaty
instrument. The existence of an express treaty-based right to water in
limited circumstances is discussed below in sections A and B. This is in
contrast with an implied or derivative right to water under treaty law, which
will be addressed in sections C and D of this part.

A. An Express Right to Water for Children, Women, Persons with
Disabilities, and Certain Persons in Armed Conflicts
Various international treaties have expressly recognized a right to water
as part of their range of human rights guarantees. Regional treaties also
offer a potentially solid basis for water as a human right. The most
prominent international treaties that expressly recognize a right to water are
7
the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child (“CRC”), the UN
8
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (“CRPD”), the UN
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against
9
10
Women (“CEDAW”), and the Geneva Conventions. Regional treaties that
expresly recognize the right include the African Charter on the Rights and
11
Welfare of the Child (“African Children’s Rights Charter”) and the
Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the
12
Rights of Women in Africa (the “Maputo Protocol”). All of these

6.
See Statement by Green Cross International, U.S. SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT
PLATFORM (Apr. 21, 2005), https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/index.php?page=
view&type=255&nr=2158&menu=35.
7.
Convention on the Rights of a Child art. 24, Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3
[hereinafter CRC].
8.
Convention of the Rights of Persons with Disabilities art. 28, Dec. 13, 2006, 2515
U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter CRPD].
9.
Convention of the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women art.
14, Dec. 18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13 [hereinafter CEDAW].
10.
See infra notes 36–37.
11.
African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child art. 14, July 11, 1990,
CAB/LEG/24.9/49 [hereinafter African Children’s Rights Charter].
12.
Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Rights of
Women in Africa art. 15, July 11, 2003, African Union Assembly, Decision on the Draft
Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights Relating to Women,
Assembly/AU/Dec.19 (III), https://au.int/en/treaties/protocol-african-charter-human-and-
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instruments are limited in scope, as they apply only to specific categories of
individuals or groups. People who do not fall within one of the categories
protected by a given treaty are not able to claim the rights it guarantees.
These group-based treaties are nevertheless salient to the examination of
whether a universal right to water exists and are thus assessed herein.
Beginning with the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, CRC
article 24(1) recognizes the child’s right to enjoy “the highest attainable
standard of health” and medical facilities, requiring States Parties to “strive
to ensure that no child is deprived of his or her right of access to such health
care services.” Article 24(2) proceeds to list categories of measures that
States Parties “shall take”—as “appropriate”—to fully implement article
24(1), including measures “[t]o combat disease and malnutrition, including
within the framework of primary health care[,] through, inter alia, . . . the
13
provision of adequate nutritious foods and clean drinking-water[.]”
But while the CRC creates an obligation for states to provide clean
drinking water, that obligation is limited to the context of the child’s right to
14
the enjoyment of health. That is, the right that accompanies states’
obligations may only be claimed by children—human beings below the age
15
of eighteen. Additionally, it is arguable that the provision of water is only
obligatory under the CRC insofar as water is the nexus to realize the health
of the child. Indeed, scholars who have analyzed the CRC’s travaux
préparatoires affirm this interpretation of article 24 by pointing out that
India proposed the introduction of the expression “clean drinking water” in
recognition of its importance for avoiding serious disease and even death in
16
children.
However, while it is clearly understood that water is indispensable to
the basic health of a child (or any person), there is reason to believe the
CRC’s right to water might extend even farther. Water is, after all, critical to
health in many senses and what constitutes health can be broadly defined.
This is a proposition that finds interpretive support in the Committee on the
Rights of the Child’s General Comment 15 which points to water’s
essentiality both in the prevention of water-related diseases and, more
17
broadly, to life and other human rights.
peoples-rights-rights-women-africa [hereinafter Maputo Protocol on the Rights of Women in
Africa].
13.
CRC, supra note 7, art. 24 (emphasis added).
14.
See id. art. 24(1). The child’s right to water can also be implied from the child’s
right to an adequate standard of living in CRC article 27.
15.
See id. art. 1.
16.
JIMENA CHÁVARRO, THE HUMAN RIGHT TO WATER: A LEGAL COMPARATIVE
PERSPECTIVE AT THE INTERNATIONAL, REGIONAL AND DOMESTIC LEVEL 59 (2014);
SHARON DETRICK, A COMMENTARY ON THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE RIGHTS
OF THE CHILD 405, 409 (1999).
17.
UN Comm. on the Rights of the Child, General Comment 15 (2013) on the Right of
the Child to the Enjoyment of the Highest Attainable Standard of Health (art. 24), ¶ 48, U.N.
Doc. CRC/C/GC/15 (Apr. 17, 2013), providing that:
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A similar regional expression of an explicit right to water as a
derivative of the right to health can be found in article 14(2)(c) of the
18
African Children’s Rights Charter. The African Children’s Rights Charter
adopts language and structure similar to the CRC’s, although the African
Children’s Rights Charter refers to safe drinking water as opposed to the
19
CRC’s clean drinking water.
Treaties addressing women’s rights also expressly affirm the existence
of the right to water, albeit in a limited context. The UN Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women provides rural
women with a right to water as part of their right to participate in and
20
benefit from rural development. Articles 14(1) and (2) of CEDAW detail
the unique challenges that rural women—who represent a quarter of the
21
world’s population —face both in ensuring the economic survival of their
families and in contributing non-monetized work to their communities and
22
households. In response to this problem, CEDAW requires States Parties
Safe and clean drinking water and sanitation are essential for the full enjoyment of
life and all other human rights. Government departments and local authorities
responsible for water and sanitation should recognize their obligation to help realize
children’s right to health, and actively consider child indicators on malnutrition,
diarrhoea and other water related diseases and household size when planning and
carrying out infrastructure expansion and the maintenance of water services, and
when making decisions on amounts for free minimum allocation and service
disconnections. States are not exempted from their obligations, even when they
have privatized water and sanitation.
18.
See African Children’s Rights Charter, supra note 11, art. 14 (“(1) Every child shall
have the right to enjoy the best attainable state of physical, mental and spiritual health. (2)
State Parties to the present Charter shall undertake to pursue the full implementation of this
right and in particular shall take measures: . . . (c) to ensure the provision of adequate nutrition
and safe drinking water . . . .” (emphasis added); see also HENRY SHUE, BASIC RIGHTS:
SUBSISTENCE, AFFLUENCE, AND U.S FOREIGN POLICY 51 (1980); SANDRA FREDMAN,
HUMAN RIGHTS TRANSFORMED: POSITIVE RIGHTS AND POSITIVE DUTIES 69 (2008).
19.
Compare African Children’s Rights Charter, supra note 11, art. 14, with CRC,
supra note 7, art. 24(2).
20.
CEDAW Comm, Gen. Recommendation No. 34 on Rural Women, ¶ 36, U.N. Doc.
CEDAW/C/GC/34 (Mar. 7, 2016).
21.
See id. ¶ 3.
22.
CEDAW art. 14(1) and (2):
(1) States Parties shall take into account the particular problems faced by rural
women and the significant roles which rural women play in the economic
survival of their families, including their work in the non-monetized sectors of
the economy, and shall take all appropriate measures to ensure the application
of the provisions of the present Convention to women in rural areas.
(2) States Parties shall take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination
against women in rural areas in order to ensure, on a basis of equality of men
and women, that they participate in and benefit from rural development and,
in particular, shall ensure to such women the right:
....
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to “take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination” against rural
women by “ensur[ing] such women the right” to “enjoy adequate living
conditions, particularly in relation to housing, sanitation, electricity and
23
water supply, transport and communications.” Article 14 of CEDAW thus
24
engenders the right to water as an intersectionality concern, by coupling
gender with socio-economic class, given the article’s specific application to
25
women who are rurally located.
The specific protection of rural women under article 14 is based on data
showing that rural women fare worse than (1) rural men and (2) both urban
26
women and men on every socio-economic indicator. Article 14 thus seeks
to ensure that rural women benefit directly from social security programs
27
and have adequate living conditions, including adequate access to water.
As with the right to water under the CDC, scholars also advance a
28
“holistic” understanding of article 14 that is supported by the CEDAW
Committee’s General Recommendation 34 asserting that “[r]ural women’s
and girls’ rights to water and sanitation are not only essential rights in
themselves, but also are key to the realization of a wide range of other
29
rights, including rights to health, food, education and participation.”

(h) To enjoy adequate living conditions, particularly in relation to housing,
sanitation, electricity and water supply, transport and communications.
23.
See id. art. 14(2)(h) (emphasis added).
24.
On intersectionality, see Kimberlé Crenshaw, Demarginalizing The Intersection of
Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of Anti-Discrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory
and Antiracist Politics, 1989 U. CHI. L.F. 139, 139–67 (1989); Sandra Fredman, Engendering
Socio-Economic Rights, in WOMEN’S HUMAN RIGHTS: CEDAW IN INTERNATIONAL,
REGIONAL AND NATIONAL LAW 218 (Anne Hellum & Henriette Sinding Aasen eds., 2013).
25.
For an intersectional perspective, anchored in Southern and Eastern African case
studies, on women’s right to water considering “intersecting and overlapping marginalizations
on the basis of gender, race, ethnicity, political exclusion, and social economic class,” see
WATER IS LIFE: WOMEN’S HUMAN RIGHTS IN NATIONAL AND LOCAL WATER GOVERNMENT
IN SOUTHERN AND EASTERN AFRICA (Anne Hellum et al. eds., 2015).
26.
See CEDAW Comm., Gen. Recommendation No. 34 on Rural Women, supra note
20, ¶ 5. This is a particularly pertinent concern in the Sub-Saharan African context where 40
billion hours are spent collecting water every year, with women bearing two-thirds of the
burden. Water, Sanitation and Hygiene (WASH), UNICEF, http://www.unicef.org/media/
media_45481.html (last visited Apr. 6, 2020); see also U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council, SubComm’n on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, Final Report of the El Hadji
Guisse (Special Rapporteur), Relationship Between the Enjoyment of Economic, Social, and
Cultural Rights and the Promotion of the Realization of the Right to Drinking Water Supply
and Sanitation, ¶¶ 18–19, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2004/20 (July 14, 2004),
https://www.cetim.ch/legacy/en/documents/rap-2004-20-ang.pdf.
27.
See generally MEGHAN CAMPBELL, WOMEN, POVERTY, EQUALITY: THE ROLE OF
CEDAW (2018).
28.
Anne Hellum, Engendering the Right to Water and Sanitation, in THE HUMAN
RIGHT TO WATER THEORY, PRACTICE AND PROSPECTS 300, 316–17 (Malcolm Langford &
Anna Russell eds., 2017).
29.
See CEDAW Comm., supra note 20, ¶ 81.
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Similarly, the Maputo Protocol recognizes the rights of African women
to food security, with a duty upon States Parties to “ensure that women have
the right to nutritious and adequate food.” States are consequently required
to take “appropriate” measures to “provide women with access to clean
30
drinking water,” per article 15(a). Like CEDAW, the Maputo Protocol’s
scope of application is limited to women and girls, and its scope is further
31
limited to African women and girls.
The Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities also
expressly provides for the right to water. Through article 28(2)(a), CRPD
States Parties “recognize the rights of persons with disabilities to social
protection,” and agree to take “appropriate steps” to “ensure [their] equal
32
access . . . to clean water services.” This same requirement has been
33
affirmed by the UN Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities.
As with the other treaties discussed in this section, the scope of application
for the CRPD is limited; this time to the protected group of persons with
34
disabilities.
The right to water under treaties pertaining to international
humanitarian law, which is the body of international law that specifically
35
finds application during international or non-international armed conflicts,
30.

The Maputo Protocol’s article 15 reads:

States Parties shall ensure that women have the right to nutritious and adequate
food. In this regard, they shall take appropriate measures to:
(a) provide women with access to clean drinking water, sources of domestic
fuel, land, and the means of producing nutritious food.
Maputo Protocol on the Rights of Women in Africa, supra note 12, art. 15.
31.
See id., art. 1.
32.
Article 28 of the CPRD reads, in relevant part:
2.

States Parties recognize the right of persons with disabilities to social
protection and to the enjoyment of that right without discrimination on the
basis of disability, and shall take appropriate steps to safeguard and promote
the realization of this right, including measures:
(a) To ensure equal access by persons with disabilities to clean water
services, and to ensure access to appropriate and affordable services,
devices and other assistance for disability-related needs[.]

CRPD, supra note 8, art. 28.
33.
UN Comm. on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, Guidelines on TreatySpecific Document to be Submitted by States Parties Under Article 35, Paragraph 1, of the
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, at 16, U.N. Doc. CRPD/C/2/3 (Nov.
18, 2009) (averring that, with regard to article 28, States Parties should report on “[m]easures
taken to ensure availability and access by persons with disabilities to clean water, adequate
food, clothing and housing and provide examples”). The Committee was established under
article 34 of the CRPD with the purpose of monitoring the implementation of the CRPD.
34.
CRPD, supra note 8, art. 1.
35.
See generally Dapo Akande, Legal Concepts, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE
CLASSIFICATION OF CONFLICTS (Elizabeth Wilmshurst ed., 2012); Dieter Fleck, The Law of
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also merits some analysis. While water can be implicated at the level of both
jus ad bellum (as a source of armed conflict in water-related conflict
situations) and jus in bello (with regard to the provision of water during
armed conflicts), it is through the latter that international humanitarian law
offers potential as a source of water-related rights and obligations upon
36
states. The Third and Fourth Geneva Conventions, treaty instruments that
largely also reflect customary international humanitarian law, contain
provisions that protect access to water in armed conflict-related situations
for persons such as prisoners of war, internees, and civilians, thereby
creating water-related rights and obligations that bind parties participating
37
in hostilities.

B. Limitations of Existing Express Treaty-Based Rights to Water
Many of the treaties assessed above are limited scope, ratione personae
treaties that apply only to specific categories of groups or individuals. These
treaties thus do not offer a general, free-standing right to water. In fact, they
often formulate the right to water as a derivative of another “principal” or
“core” right, whether it is the right to health (in the CRC), to social
protection (in the CRPD), or to adequate living conditions (in the CEDAW).
The “ill-defined status” of the right, as scholar Amanda Cahill frames it,
38
“causes confusion as to the scope and core content of the right to water.”
That confusion raises problems concerning the right’s justiciability and
implementation, presenting the challenge of establishing “whether
violations are of the right to water itself or, first and foremost, violations of

Non-International Armed Conflicts, in THE HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN
LAW 581 (Dieter Fleck ed., 2013); Christine Byron, Armed Conflicts: International or NonInternational?, 6 J. CONFLICT & SEC. L. 63 (2001).
36.
Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War
(IV Geneva Convention) arts. 85, 89, 127, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 287; Geneva
Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (III Geneva Convention) arts. 20,
26, 29, 46, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 135.
37.
See Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, supra note
36, at 99, 102–03, 109 (guaranteeing sufficient water for drinking purposes and other human
needs); Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War,
supra note 36, at 197–98, 213 (mentioning water and the protection of civilian persons in
times of war); Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 and
Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts art. 54, June 8, 1977,
1125 U.N.T.S. 3 (prohibiting the attacking, destroying, removing or rendering “useless objects
indispensable to the survival of the civilian population” including “drinking water installations
and supplies and irrigation works, for the specific purpose of denying them for their
sustenance value to the civilian population or to the adverse Party”); see also LAURENCE
BOISSON DE CHAZOURNES, FRESH WATER IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 169–73 (2013); cf.
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 and Relating to the
Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II) arts. 5, 14, June 8,
1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609.
38.
Amanda Cahill, The Human Right to Water––A Right of Unique Status: The Legal
Status and Normative Content of the Right to Water, 9 INT’L J. HUM. RTS. 389, 391 (2005).
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39

other related rights.” Cahill thus illuminates the challenge of cogently
asserting that a right to water, as formulated in one of the treaties above,
40
has, as a matter of law, been violated.
In the context of international humanitarian law, scholar Inga Winkler
has argued that if water-related guarantees exist even in the strenuous
context of armed conflicts, where significant derogations from various
human rights protections are often permitted, then they must continue in
times of peace when there would ordinarily be no “military necessity”
41
justification for restricting human rights. While Winkler’s deductive
reasoning may be attractive, it is in apparent contradiction with the Geneva
Conventions’ facial ratione materiae (armed conflict) and ratione personae
(prisoners of war, internees, and civilians) limitations.
Ultimately, all of the treaties assessed to this point referencing an
express right to water are insufficient to establish a universal human right to
water as well as to determine the right’s content and correlated duties upon
42
states. They apply only to rural women, children, persons with disabilities,
or certain persons in armed conflicts, as the case may be, although the
application of water-related rights and obligations may sometimes also
extend to the dependents and families of persons within those categories.
While the “vulnerability-based” approach to the right to water taken by
43
these treaties is laudable, this article focuses on evaluating the existence of
a general human right to water. By delimiting the instances in which a
treaty-based right to water is expressly present, these treaties actually
suggest that an express, treaty-based human right to water does not yet exist.
Nevertheless, these treaties may serve as modest evaluative and deliberative
resources in determining the normative scope and substantive content of a
future, express human right to water—or even an implied human right to
water.
What follows, therefore, is a consideration of treaty law sources that
may assert the existence of a right to water, if only implied, that is not
subject to ratione materiae or ratione personae limitations.

39.
Id.
40.
See id.
41.
INGA WINKLER, THE HUMAN RIGHT TO WATER: SIGNIFICANCE, LEGAL STATUS
AND IMPLICATIONS FOR WATER ALLOCATION 62 (2012).
42.
A human right is a right that is of general application to all human beings by virtue
of the biological status of their humanity alone.
43.
The vulnerability-based approach has even been adopted into broader international
agendas. See, e.g., G.A. Res. 70/1, Transforming Our World: The 2030 Agenda for
Sustainable Development, Goal 6.2 (Sept. 25, 2015) (setting out in Target 6.2 of the United
Nations Sustainable Development Goals to “achieve access to adequate and equitable
sanitation and hygiene for all and end open defecation, paying special attention to the needs of
women and girls and those in vulnerable situations”).
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C. A Universal Implied Right to Water
Two international treaties potentially support an implied right to water:
the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
(“ICESCR”), and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
44
(“ICCPR”). This article argues that these treaties support an implied right
to water that is of general application, relying on judicial, quasi-judicial, and
soft law sources as interpretive aids.

1. Implying the Right to Water Under the ICESCR
Support for a right to water under the ICESCR finds textual anchorage
45
in two provisions: articles 11(1) and 12. Article 11(1) of the ICESCR
reads:
The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of
everyone to an adequate standard of living for himself and his
family, including adequate food, clothing and housing, and to the
continuous improvement of living conditions. The States Parties
will take appropriate steps to ensure the realization of this right,
recognizing to this effect the essential importance of international
46
co-operation based on free consent.
While article 11(1) does not refer to water explicitly, the UN Economic
and Social Council’s Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
47
(the “CESCR” or the “Committee”) has repeatedly interpreted this
provision as including a right to water as part of the individual’s right to an

44.
Cf. Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International
Watercourses, art. 10(2), May 21, 1997, 2999 U.N.T.S. (requiring special regard be given to
“the requirements of vital human needs” in the event of a conflict between uses of an
international watercourse).
45.
See Cahill, supra note 38, at 390. Cahill also points out that article 1(2) of ICESCR
provides that “in no case may a people be deprived of its own means of subsistence” and
argues that means of subsistence must include water. Id. at 391.
46.
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights [ICESCR] art.
11(1), Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 (emphasis added); see also U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council,
Comm. on Econ., Soc., and Cultural Rights, General Comment 12: The Right to Adequate
Food, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1999/5 (1999) (interpreting the right to adequate food as
applying to “everyone” without any limitation upon the applicability of this right to
individuals or to female headed households despite the ICESCR’s gendered reference to
“himself and his family”).
47.
The Committee is a body of eighteen independent experts that is tasked with
monitoring the implementation of the ICESCR by its States Parties and with developing
general interpretations of the ICESCR’s provisions (called “General Comments”). It was
established by resolution of the UN Economic and Social Council [“ECOSOC”] to carry out
the monitoring functions assigned to ECOSOC in Part IV of the ICESCR. See U.N. OFFICE OF
THE HIGH COMM’R, Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Introduction,
http://www.ohchr.org/en/hrbodies/cescr/pages/cescrindex.aspx (last visited Apr. 6, 2020).
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48

adequate standard of living for herself and her family. Essentially, the
Committee utilized article 11(1) to carve out a free-standing right to water,
49
as water is amongst the pre-requisites for an adequate standard of living.
The right to an adequate standard of living is thus the “source right” for the
50
right to water.
In its most expansive analysis of the right to water, the CESCR’s
General Comment 15 sets out its legal bases, its normative content, states’
51
obligations with regard to the right (and what would constitute corollary
52
53
state violations thereof), state implementation requirements, and the
54
obligations of non-state actors. Notably, the CESCR’s discussion of
General Comment 15 extends only to water for personal and domestic use
and thus excludes considerations borne out of commercialization or
55
transboundary concerns, for example.
In General Comment 15, the CESCR principally relied on three implicit
56
legal justifications for reading the right to water into the ICESCR. The first
is the original intent of the ICESCR drafters, who, the Committee argued,
used the word “including” in ICESCR article 11(1) as an indication that the
catalogue of rights mentioned there (food, clothing, and housing) was not

48.
U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council, Comm. on Econ., Soc., and Cultural Rights, General
Comment 15: The Right to Water (2002), supra note 5, (offering a full exposition of the right
to water under the ICESCR); U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council, Comm. on Econ., Soc., and Cultural
Rights, General Comment 4: The Right to Adequate Housing, ¶ 8, U.N. Doc. E/1992/23 (Dec.
13, 1991) (recognizing, in a more limited capacity than General Comment 15, that all
beneficiaries of the right to adequate housing have a right to sustainable access to safe
drinking water, without elaboration on the right’s legal source or normative content).
49.
See Takele Bulto, The Emergence of the Human Right to Water in International
Human Rights Law: Invention or Discovery?, 12 MELB. J. INT’L L. 299 (2011).
50.
Pierre Thielbörger, Re-Conceptualizing the Human Right to Water: A Pledge for
a Hybrid Approach, 15 HUM. RTS. L. REV. 225, 226 (2015).
51.
See U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council, Comm. on Econ., Soc., and Cultural Rights,
General Comment 15: The Right to Water, supra note 5, ¶¶ 17–38.
52.
See id. ¶¶ 2–38.
53.
See id. ¶¶ 39–44.
54.
See id. ¶ 60.
55.
Id. ¶ 2. See generally Catarina de Albuquerque & Inga Winkler, Neither Friend Nor
Foe––Why the Commercialization of Water and Sanitation Services Is Not the Main Issue for
the Realization of Human Rights, 17 BROWN J. WORLD AFF. 167 (2010); Malcolm Langford,
Privatisation and the Right to Water, in THE HUMAN RIGHT TO WATER THEORY, PRACTICE
AND PROSPECTS, supra note 28, at 463; Andrew Lang, Privatisation and Regulatory
Autonomy: The Right to Water and International Economic Law, in THE HUMAN RIGHT TO
WATER THEORY, PRACTICE AND PROSPECTS, supra note 28, at 531 (for a discussion on the
commercialization and privatization of water).
56.
Though scholars have ascribed these three justifications to the CESCR from their
readings of Comment 15, the CESCR itself did not frame its justifications in the exact
language scholars have since used. The words “derivative” and “multiplier” for instance are
nowhere to be found in Comment 15 and are the byproduct of scholarly analysis.
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57

intended to be exhaustive but rather exemplary. The Committee’s
understanding of the term “including” reflects a legal drafting tradition that
58
is frequently adopted by domestic and international law-making organs.
59
The second justification is that water is a multiplier right. Water is of
overarching salience in the realization of other rights, as without water other
rights cannot be fulfilled. As the Committee framed it, water “clearly falls
within the category of guarantees essential for securing an adequate
standard of living, particularly since it is one of the most fundamental
60
conditions for survival.” Indeed, the Committee recognized that water is
necessary “to realise many of the [ICESCR] rights” such as adequate food,
61
health and environmental hygiene, livelihood, and cultural practices.
62
The third justification relates to water as a derivative right, derived
63
from—as opposed to contributing to—the rights to life, dignity, or health.
The Committee points out that water “should also be seen in conjunction
with other rights enshrined in the International Bill of Human Rights,
57.
See U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council, Comm. on Econ., Soc., and Cultural Rights,
General Comment 15: The Right to Water, supra note 5, ¶ 3.
58.
The interpretive inclusion of the right to water in article 11(1) is anchored in
teleological interpretation under the primary rule of treaty interpretation contained in article
31(1) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (the “VCLT”). See Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 31(1), May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 [hereinafter
VCLT] (requiring that “[a] treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the
ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its
object and purpose”); see also Bulto supra note 49 at 302.
59.
Sandra Fredman, supra note 18, at 216.
60.
U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council, Comm. on Econ., Soc., and Cultural Rights, General
Comment 15: The Right to Water, supra note 5, ¶ 3; see also David Copp, The Right to an
Adequate Standard of Living: Justice, Autonomy, and the Basic Needs, 9 SOC. PHIL. & POL’Y
231, 252 (1992) (concluding that “[a]ny credible analysis of the concept of a basic need would
imply . . . basic needs [such as] clean water.”); cf. WINKLER, supra note 41, 43 (highlighting
the challenge of determining what forms the right to an adequate living under article 11(1) of
the ICESCR while advancing Engbruch’s assumption that an adequate standard of living is
met “when individuals live in an environment and under conditions that allow them to
participate in social life while maintaining their dignity and to realise their rights by their own
means”).
61.
U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council, Comm. on Econ., Soc., and Cultural Rights, Gen.
Comment 15: The Right to Water, supra note 5, ¶ 6; see also U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council,
Comm. on Econ., Soc. and Cultural Rights, General Comment 14: The Right to the Highest
Attainable Standard of Health (art. 12), ¶ 15, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/2000/4 (2000).
62.
See, e.g., Cahill, supra note 38, at 391 (arguing that because water is a crucial
element of the ICESCR’s article 11 rights to food, clothing, and housing, “the right to water
still exists in international human rights law with a ‘unique status’––somewhere between that
of a derivative right and an independent right”); Comm. on Elimination of Discrimination
Against Women, General Recommendation 34 (2016) on the Rights of Rural Women, ¶¶ 81–
85, U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/GC/34 (2016) (recognizing the right to water as a component of
both the right to health and the right to housing).
63.
See Chávarro, supra note 16 at 48 (finding a derivative right to water under the
ICESCR rights to food, health, and an adequate standard of living); Erik Bluemel, The
Implications of Formulating a Human Right to Water, 31 ECOLOGY L.Q. 957, 969–70 (2005).
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64

foremost amongst them the right to life and human dignity.” The value of
the right to water can thus be seen as being of intrinsic value; its worth
derives from its “inherent qualities, powers, and potentialities” and not by
65
being ascribed through social conventions or subjective preferences.
The CESCR also found a right to water in the context of the right to
66
health in ICESCR article 12. This argument was advanced in detail in the
67
Committee’s General Comment 14. In that Comment, the Committee
stated first that the article 12(1) right to health is “an inclusive right
extending not only to timely and appropriate health care but also to the
underlying determinants of health, such as access to safe and potable
68
water . . .” The Committee also interpreted ICESCR article 12(2)(b),
requiring “the improvement of all aspects of environmental and industrial
hygiene” to include, inter alia, a requirement “to ensure an adequate supply
69
of safe and potable water and basic sanitation.”
The CESCR’s various justifications for the legal foundations of the
right to water have not been without scholarly demur and criticism. The
principal objector is Stephen Tully, who has taken issue with General
70
Comment 15. Tully criticizes General Comment 15 as “revisionist” and
admonishes what he sees as the Committee’s invention of a novel right to
71
water. His reasoning is described below, though this article is restricted to
addressing his legal and normative concerns and refrains from engaging
72
with his policy-based considerations.
First, Tully disputes the Committee’s expansive reading of the word
“including” in article 11(1) ICESCR, arguing that it is a “self-evidently
imprecise term” that leads one to “speculate on the number and nature of
64.
U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council, Comm. on Econ., Soc., and Cultural Rights, General
Comment 15: The Right to Water, supra note 5, ¶ 3 (referring presumably to the rights to life
and dignity in the UDHR, ICESCR, ICCPR, and the Optional Protocols).
65.
Michael Penn & Aditi Malik, The Protection and Development of the Human
Spirit: An Expanded Focus for Human Rights Discourse, 32 HUM. RTS. Q. 665, 667 (2010).
66.
Thielbörger, supra note 50, 228–29.
67.
See also U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council, Comm. on Econ., Soc., and Cultural Rights,
General Comment 15: The Right to Water, supra note 5, ¶¶ 3, 8, 11–13, 44 (approaching the
right to water from the perspective of the right to health).
68.
U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council, Comm. on Econ., Soc. and Cultural Rights, General
Comment 14: The Right to the Highest Attainable Standard of Health, supra note 61, ¶ 11.
69.
Id. ¶ 15.
70.
See generally Stephen Tully, A Human Right to Access Water? A Critique of
General Comment No. 15, 23 NETH. Q. HUM. RTS. 35, 63 (2005).
71.
Bulto supra note 49, at 292.
72.
There is a series of relevant debates between Stephen Tully and Malcolm Langford
on General Comment 15. See generally Malcolm Langford, Ambition That Overleaps Itself? A
Response to Stephen Tully’s Critique of the General Comment on the Right to Water,
24 NETH. Q. HUM. RTS. 433 (2006); Stephen Tully, Flighty Purposes and Deeds: A Rejoinder
to Malcolm Langford, 24 NETH. Q. HUM. RTS. 461 (2006); Malcolm Langford, Expectation of
Plenty: Response to Stephen Tully, 24 NETH. Q. HUM. RTS. 473 (2006). For Tully’s policybased considerations, see generally Tully, supra note 70, at 45–51.
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other characteristics essential to an adequate standard of living but not
73
explicitly guaranteed by the [ICESCR].” Effectively, Tully faults the
74
Committee for engaging in a form of proliferation of rights. To him, an
expansive reading of the word “including” could encompass rights to
electricity, the internet, or other civic services, “open[ing] up the floodgates
75
of other less important rights.” Tully does nevertheless accept an implied
right to access water but only insofar as it is necessary to grow food or
76
satisfy housing needs.
Tully’s second critique is that the CESCR’s inclusion of water as an
article 11 right was outside its competence as an interpretive, non-legislative
body. Tully argues that the ICESCR’s travaux préparatoires reveal states’
77
deliberate omission of a right to water at the drafting stage. Thus, Tully
suggests that the Committee’s recognition of water as a human right was, in
effect, an amendment of the ICESCR. Since amending the ICESCR to add
new rights is only possible through the amendment procedure outlined in
78
ICESCR article 29, Tully’s argument implies that the Committee invented
79
rather than discovered the right to water.
Tully’s views were rendered in the mid-2000s, and much of the wind
has been taken out of his revisionism objection by the passage of time. The
global consensus—or at least the absence of express objection—to water’s
recognition as a human right is today epitomized by the non-binding 2010
UN General Assembly Resolution 64/292, which recognized the “right to
safe and clean drinking water and sanitation as a human right that is
80
essential for the full enjoyment of life and all human rights.”
While Tully is correct that the meaning of the phrase “adequate
standard of living” in article 11(1) ICESCR is imprecise, other scholars
have compellingly argued that, at a minimum, an “adequate standard of

73.
Id. at 36–37. Cf. Langford, Ambition That Overleaps Itself? A Response to Stephen
Tully’s Critique of the General Comment on the Right to Water, supra note 72.
74.
See Phillip Alston, Conjuring Up New Human Rights: A Proposal for Quality
Control, 78 AM. J. INT’L L. 607 (1984).
75.
Tully, A Human Right to Access Water?, supra note 70, at 37; Stephen Tully, A
Human Right to Access the Internet? Problems and Prospects, 14 HUM. RTS. L. REV. 175
(1984).
76.
Tully, A Human Right to Access Water?, supra note 70, at 36–37.
77.
Tully, A Human Right to Access Water?, supra note 70, at 37 (citing generally, for
analysis of the traveaux, P.H. Gleick, The Human Right to Water, 1 WATER POL’Y 487, 491
(1999) (suggesting, without providing an explicit source, that “the framers of the UDHR
considered water to be implicitly included as one of the ‘component elements’—as
fundamental as air”)).
78.
Id.
79.
Cf. Bulto, supra note 49, at 298 (arguing that the water was a more of a “discovery”
than an “invention”).
80.
G.A. Res. 64/292, ¶ 1 (July 28, 2010); see also id. pmbl. (recalling the General
Assembly’s various previous resolutions on the right to development, the decade of water
action, and the habitat agenda, amongst others, that have affirmed a human right to water).

2020]

Unmuddying the Waters

469

living” requires an environment that allows individuals to “participate in
81
social life while maintaining their dignity.” Without access to water, then,
realizing an adequate standard of living would be impossible. As for Tully’s
concern that admitting a right to water is a slippery slope, this is more
hypothetical than a real risk. Jenny Granwall observed that the Committee’s
treatment of water as a pre-requisite for other rights restricts the potential
for “any flood of new rights only because the special status of water is
82
recognised.”
The thrust of Tully’s second critique can be neutralized through an
examination of the ICESCR’s travaux préparatoires. Pierre Thielbörger
compellingly argues that the ICESCR’s textual silence on water ought not to
83
be interpreted as a consensus that there is not a right to water. A plausible
alternative is that the drafters’ textual omission constitutes a merely
“negligent silence,” as water was simply forgotten, or taken for granted, at
84
the time of drafting the ICESCR. This theory is particularly convincing
when considering that a global food crisis was contemporaneous to the
ICESCR’s drafting, while drinking water was considered to be a plentiful
85
and renewable natural resource. The absence of a specifically elaborated
right to water in article 11 should thus be understood as neither an
exclusionary nor an inclusionary absence, as Takele Bulto argues, but as
86
resulting simply from a lack of “cognition” or “recognition.”
Moreover, even assuming that the travaux préparatoires did establish
the exclusion of water as a human right, the travaux are of only secondary
87
interpretive significance under article 32 of the VCLT. Since regional
bodies, including the Inter-American Court on Human Rights in Xákmok
Kásek Indigenous Community v. Paraguay, have accepted General
Comment 15’s interpretation of an implied article 11 right to water, it
appears that Tully’s understanding of the meaning and significance of the
88
travaux is not universally held.
WINKLER, supra note 41, at 43.
JENNY GRANWALL, ACCESS TO WATER: RIGHTS, OBLIGATIONS, AND THE
BANGALORE SITUATION 215 (2008).
83.
Thielbörger, supra note 50, 227.
84.
Id.
85.
Id.
86.
Bulto, supra note 49, at 303 (citing Matthew Craven, Some Thoughts on the
Emergent Right to Water, in THE HUMAN RIGHT TO WATER 37, 38 (Eibe Riedel & Peter
Rothen eds., 2006). Indeed, this is largely what Gleick was saying, too. See P.H. Gleick, The
Human Right to Water, 1 WATER POL’Y 487, 491 (1999).
87.
Recourse to the travaux préparatoires is secondary in light of article 32 of VCLT,
providing that interpretative recourse to the preparatory works would only follow where the
primary methods in article 31 VCLT are ambiguous, obscure, or lead to a result that is
manifestly absurd or unreasonable. See VCLT, supra note 58, art. 32.
88.
Xákmok Kásek Indigenous Community v. Paraguay, Merits, Reparations, and
Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) ¶ 195 (Aug. 24, 2010). Here, it was held that the
supply of 2.17 litres of water per person per day by the government to the indigenous
81.
82.
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2. Implying the Right to Water Under the ICCPR
Like the ICESCR, the ICCPR may also be read to include an implied
right to water. In the ICCPR, that right would be found in its article 6(1)
guarantee of the right to life, expressed thus: “Every human being has the
inherent right to life. This right shall be protected by law. No one shall be
89
arbitrarily deprived of his life.”
The argument that the right to life implies a right to water is relatively
banal, yet it is potent in its forcefulness: Water is a non-substitutable
resource that is essential at the most basic level to ensure the survival and
sustenance of human life. Lack of water is a “deprivation that threatens life,
90
destroys opportunity and undermines human dignity.”
Whether the article 6(1) right to life includes access to water, however,
is not cut and dry. The right to “life” in article 6(1) can arguably be
understood in two senses. The first is in the strict and narrow sense that it
would impose negative obligations of restraint or non-interference upon the
state, which cannot to deprive a person of their life. The second is broader,
requiring the state to, in addition to its negative obligations, also take
positive steps to safeguard life.
Those who believe that article 6(1) adopts the narrow approach point to
both the text and context of the ICCPR. Yoram Dinstein, for example, has
argued that “[t]he human right to life per se . . . is a civil right and does not
guarantee any person against death from famine or cold or lack of medical
91
attention.” The ambit of ICCPR article 6, his argument goes, is confined to
protection against the deprivation of life through means of homicide, not the
freedom to live as one wishes or the right to have an appropriate standard of
92
living. Dinstein’s restrictive interpretation may be further buttressed when
considering that the right to life is contained in the ICCPR, which
enumerates civil and political rights, and not the ICESCR, with socioeconomic rights. This placement implies that article 6(1) ICCPR is to be
understood only in the civil rights sense and at the exclusion of its socio-

community of Xákmok Kásek was not sufficient in quantity and of adequate quality, and had
exposed them to risks and disease. The court described water as essential to meet “basic
needs, including food and hygiene” while citing articles 11 and 12 of the General Comment
15; see also CHAZOURNES, supra note 36, at 158.
89.
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights [ICCPR] art. 6.1, Dec. 16,
1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171.
90.
UN Dev. Programme, Human Development Report––Beyond Scarcity: Power,
Poverty and the Global Water Crisis, at 5 (2006).
.
Yoram Dinstein, The Right to Life, Physical Integrity, and Liberty, in THE
91
INTERNATIONAL BILL OF RIGHTS: THE COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS 115
(Louis Henkin ed., 1981).
92.
Id. Notably, the travaux préparatoires of the ICCPR contain comments on the right
to life as it relates to state deprivation of an individual’s life. See MARC BOSSUYT, GUIDE TO
THE “TRAVAUX PRÉPARATOIRES” OF THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND
POLITICAL RIGHTS 115, 115–36 (1987).
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economic connotations, such as an individual’s underlying need to access
clean drinking water.
However, this interpretation is disputed by an authoritative source. In
1982 the UN Human Rights Committee (“UNHRC”), the ICCPR’s treaty
93
body, adopted General Comment 6 on the Right to Life. In General
Comment 6, the UNHRC eschewed the narrow and restrictive interpretation
94
of article 6 as vacuous. Instead, according to scholar Antonio Trindade, it
opined that a “modern and proper” construction of life should not only
protect against any arbitrary deprivation of life but should also place states
under a duty to “‘pursue policies which are designed to ensure access to the
95
means of survival’ for all individuals and all peoples.” While the
UNHRC’s General Comment 6 did not specify that a broader reading of the
right to life included a right to water, it did state that the protection of the
96
right to life “requires that States adopt positive measures.” Updating its
analysis in 2018’s General Comment 36, the UNHRC expressly included
97
access to water as a component of the right to life.

III. A Right to Water Under CIL?
A. The Significance of Settling the Existence of a Right to Water
Under CIL
Like treaty law, CIL is one of the three principal sources of
international law recognized by article 38(1)(b) of the International Court of

93.
UN Human Rights Committee [U.N. HRC], General Comment 6 art. 6 (Right to
Life), ¶ 5, U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.1 (Apr. 30, 1982) [hereinafter U.N. HRC General
Comment 6].
94.
See id.; Cahill, supra note 38, at 397.
95.
Antonio A. Cancado Trindade, The Parallel Evolutions of International Human
Rights Protections and of Environmental Protection and the Absence of Restrictions on the
Exercise of Recognized Human Rights, 13 REVISTA INSTITUTO INTERAMERICANO DE
DERECHOS HUMANOS 35, 51 (1991) (quoting B.G. Ramcharan, The Right to Life, 30 NETH.
INT’L L. REV. 301, 302 (1983). Further, the UN HRC stated that the ICCPR “should be
interpreted as a living instrument and the rights protected under it should be applied in context
and in the light of present-day conditions.” U.N. HRC, Comm. No. 829/1988, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/78/D/829/1998 (Aug. 13, 2003) (stating the ICCPR “should be interpreted as a living
instrument and the rights protected under it should be applied in context and in the light of
present-day conditions”).
96.
U.N. HRC General Comment 6, supra note 93, ¶ 5.
97.
U.N. HRC, General Comment 36 on Article 6 (Right to Life), ¶ 26, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/GC/36 (Oct. 30, 2018) (“The measures called for to address adequate conditions for
protecting the right to life include, where necessary, measures designed to ensure access
without delay by individuals to essential goods and services such as food, water, shelter,
health care, electricity and sanitation, and other measures designed to promote and facilitate
adequate general conditions, such as the bolstering of effective emergency health services,
emergency response operations (including firefighters, ambulance services and police forces)
and social housing programmes.”) (emphasis added).
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98

Justice (“ICJ”) Statute. Whether or not a treaty-based right to CIL exists, it
is valuable to independently evaluate the existence of a right to water in
customary international law. A treaty-based right to water, whether express
or implied, is only enforceable against states that are party to the treaty in
question. A right to water that is predicated in customary international law,
99
in contrast, would be binding on all states, save for persistent objectors.
This is particularly pertinent if we consider that the ICESCR, arguably the
most compelling treaty from which water can be asserted as a right, has not
100
attained universal signature and ratification by states. Further, even where
a treaty norm and a CIL norm have exactly the same content, both create
101
independent obligations for states.
Like a treaty-based right, a CIL right would have potential application
both between states and within states. Between states, a CIL norm could
102
potentially trigger state liability for breaches of conduct. Within states, a
CIL norm may also have an immediate impact, as a number of national
constitutions follow a monist approach and automatically domesticate
international customs, even as new customs are formed, into binding
103
national law—without the need for additional legislation.
Consider river damming, a common infrastructure project that has
potentially adverse effects upon water access for downstream riparian states
104
and their populations. Asserting the existence of a CIL right to water
would, theoretically at least, place obligations upon upstream riparian states,
even where such states may have entered into bilateral or multilateral
treaties concerning water resources to the contrary.
A CIL right to water would also have particular significance in the
context of investor-state arbitration, where foreign investors sue states, often
98.
Charter of the United Nations and Statute of the International Court of Justice art.
38(1), June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1055, T.S. No. 993 [hereinafter ICJ Statute].
99.
The persistent objector rule provides that a state that persistently objects to a rule of
customary international law during the formative stages of that rule will not be bound by that
rule when it comes into existence for as long as it consistently maintains its objection. See
Olufemi Elias, Persistent Objector, in THE MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF PUBLIC
INTERNATIONAL LAW (Rüdiger Wolfrum ed., 2012); Int’l Law Comm’n, Rep. on the Work of
Its Sixty-Seventh Session, U.N. Doc. A/70/10, at ¶ 59 n.75 (2015) (defining “persistent
objector”).
100.
Treaties: Status of Ratification, U.N. HUMAN RIGHTS OFFICE OF THE HIGH
COMMISSIONER (2014), http://indicators.ohchr.org (last visited Apr. 6, 2020).
101.
Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.),
Judgment, 1984 I.C.J. 14, ¶ 175 (June 26).
102.
G.A. Res. 62/61, Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (Jan. 8,
2008).
103.
See, e.g., CONSTITUTION, 1994, § 211 (Malawi); CONSTITUTION, 1996, § 322, (S.
Afr.); CONSTITUTION, 2010, art. 2(5) (Kenya); CONSTITUTION 1990, art. 144 (Namibia);
GRUNDGESETZ [BASIC LAW], art. 25 (Ger.), translation at https://www.btgbestellservice.de/pdf/80201000.pdf.
104.
See Gabčikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung. v. Slovk.), Judgment, 1997 I.C.J. 88
(Sept. 25).
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under bilateral investment treaties. Investor-state arbitrations have proven to
be fertile ground for human rights arguments in the context of water-related
investments of significant public interest that have direct impacts upon
water access for local populations, including concessional contracts for
privatized water provision.
A prominent illustration is the Biwater v. Tanzania arbitration before
105
the ICSID Tribunal. After Tanzania privatized public services and
utilities, including water, it entered into a ten-year contract with a private
106
entity that was partly owned by Biwater Group, a British water company.
After Biwater failed to deliver on its contractual obligations, Tanzania
terminated the contract and took control of various Biwater assets. Biwater
brought ICSID claims against Tanzania for unlawful expropriation of
property and for failure to provide the company with fair and equitable
107
treatment. During the arbitration proceedings, Tanzania argued that, by
failing to provide the contracted water provision, Biwater had created “a
real threat to public health and welfare”—though it did not go so far as to
108
describe water as a human right.
However, non-governmental
organizations that were amici curiae before the Tribunal submitted
arguments rooted in the characterization of water as a human right under
109
General Comment 15. Unfortunately, the Tribunal failed to address the
110
existence of a treaty-based human right to water argument directly.
While similar right to water arguments have been raised in other
111
investor-state dispute proceedings concerning water,
a study by
international water law scholar Tamar Meshel—reviewing investor-state
arbitrations that have involved a right to water defense—revealed that
arbitral tribunals have largely refrained from directly addressing the right to
112
water’s potential effects on the investment protection obligations of states.

105.
Biwater Gauff Ltd. v. United Republic of Tanz., ICSID Case No. ARB/05/22,
Award (July 24, 2008).
106.
See Tamar Meshel, Human Rights in Investor-State Arbitration: The Human Right
to Water and Beyond, 6 J. INT’L DISP. SETTLEMENT 277, 290 (2015).
107.
Biwater Gauff, Award, ¶ 95.
108.
Id., ¶ 436.
109.
Id.
110.
See id.; see also Meshel, supra note 106, at 291 (noting the structural barriers in the
wording of arbitration agreements that hinder reliance upon human rights arguments in
investor-state arbitrations).
111.
See, e.g., Compañiá de Aguas del Aconquija SA and Vivendi Universal SA v.
Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/3, Award (Aug. 20, 2007); Suez, Sociedad
General de Aguas de Barcelona SA and Interagua Servicios Integrales de Agua SA v.
Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/17, Decision on Liability (July 30, 2010); Suez,
Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona SA and Vivendi Universal SA v. Argentine
Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/19, Decision on Liability (July 30, 2010).
112.
See Meshel, supra 106, at 294; see also Emma Truswell, Thirst for Profit: Water
Privatization, Investment Law and a Human Right to Water, in EVOLUTION IN INVESTMENT
TREATY LAW AND ARBITRATION 570 (Chester Brown & Kate Miles eds., 2011).
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In those arbitrations where right to water arguments were raised, they were
113
not explicitly asserted as rooted in CIL obligations. Nevertheless, Kate
Parlett developed a persuasive argument that circumstances exist where an
investor might seek to rely on CIL as the basis of a claim for breach of an
114
obligation under an investment treaty or contract, depending on the
language of a given arbitration agreement.
This proposition invites one to interpret and apply a state’s investment
treaty obligations in light of obligations imposed by article 31(3)(c) of the
115
VCLT, itself a CIL rule. Article 31(3)(c) is also known as the principle of
116
systemic integration or harmonious interpretation. In this context, its
application follows from the view that states “may rely on human rights
obligations they owe to non-parties to the arbitration proceedings, such as
individuals or groups under their jurisdiction, as a defence to investors’
117
allegations of investment protection violations.”
Finally, there remains potential for a CIL right to water to attain the
status of an obligation erga omnes, which are obligations of states towards
the international community as a whole, that concern all states, and the
118
protection of which is a legal interest of all states. Drawing from the ICJ’s
119
obiter dictum in Barcelona Traction, obligations erga omnes would derive
from sources that include “principles and rules concerning the basic rights
120
of the human person.” Indeed, access to water at the basic level of human
sustenance and dignity is indispensable to maintaining such a basic right to
life of the human person.

113.
Id.
114.
Kate Parlett, Claims Under Customary International Law in ICSID Arbitration,
31 ICSID REV. - FOREIGN INV. L.J. 434 (2016).
115.
For authorities affirming the status of articles 31 and 32 of the VCLT as customary
international law, see Territorial Dispute (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. Chad), 1994 I.C.J. Rep.
1, ¶ 41 (Aug. 31); Oil Platforms (Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States of America), 1996
I.C.J. Rep. 23, ¶ 23 (Dec. 12); Kasikili/Sedudu Island (Botswana v. Namibia), 1999 I.C.J.
Rep. 1045, ¶ 18 (May 29); RICHARD GARDINER, TREATY INTERPRETATION 12 (2008); MARK
VILLIGER, CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW AND TREATIES: A STUDY OF THEIR
INTERACTIONS AND INTERRELATIONS WITH SPECIAL CONSIDERATION OF THE 1969 VIENNA
CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES 484–506 (1985).
116.
Adamantia Rachovitsa, The Principle of Systemic Integration in Human Rights
Law, 66 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 557 (2017); Campbell McLachlan, The Principle of Systemic
Integration and Article 31(3)(c) of the Vienna Convention, 54 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 279
(2005).
117.
Meshel, supra note 106, at 280.
118.
See generally MAURIZIO RAGAZZI, THE CONCEPT OF INTERNATIONAL
OBLIGATIONS ERGA OMNES (2000).
119.
Barcelona Traction Light and Power Company, Limited (Belgium v. Spain), 1970
I.C.J. Rep. 3, 33–34 (July 24).
120.
For a discussion of the meaning of “basic rights of the human person,” see
RAGAZZI, supra note 118, at 136–45 (2000).
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As such, in light of the potential relevance of a CIL right to water, the
possible existence of such a right is assessed below.

B. Evaluating the Right to Water in CIL Discourse
The CESCR’s adoption of General Comment 15, described above,
resulted in significant debate over the existence of a right to water under
CIL. The discourse and literature further increased after 2010 UNGA
121
Resolution 64/292 explicitly recognized the right to water. Before offering
an assessment on the existence of a CIL right to water, this section provides
an indicative summation of some of the most prominent recent scholarly
positions on the question.
The existence of a custom of international law requires both opinio juris
122
and state practice. Scholars evaluating a customary right to water reach
different conclusions about the existence of either: Daphina Misiedjan
argues that the right to water “is still materialising in customary law[,] as it
currently has a weak status, which is mostly fuelled by state practice in
123
combination with states’ statements.” Mary Arden, Justice of the Supreme
Court of the United Kingdom, only tangentially mentions the possibility of
124
a right based in CIL in her review of the potential for a right to water.
Stephen McCaffrey finds that despite the sufficiency of opinio juris, no
right to water has emerged because the right has not been recognized “by an
authoritative and generally recognized source, such as the International
Court of Justice, or by states generally,” and given that “some states that
play important roles in the international system have yet to accept the
125
existence of the right.”
In contrast, Jimena Chávarro finds that there is sufficient evidence of
both state practice and opinio juris to conclude that the right to water is an
126
independent CIL right. Likewise, Rebecca Bates has advanced the idea
that “[t]he right to water is a principle capable of being recognized as a
127
principle of customary international law.” Rhett Larson states that

G.A. Res. 64/292, supra note 80.
ICJ Statute art. 38(1)(b).
DAPHINA MISIEDJAN, TOWARDS A SUSTAINABLE HUMAN RIGHT TO WATER:
SUPPORTING VULNERABLE PEOPLE AND PROTECTING WATER RESOURCES 73 (2019).
124.
Mary Arden, J., Water for All? Developing a Human Right to Water in National
and International Law, 65 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 771, 786 (2016).
125.
Stephen C. McCaffrey, The Human Right to Water: A False Promise?, 47 U. PAC.
L. REV. 231–32 (2016). McCaffrey’s centralization of some states as more important in
international law is problematic as it risks what Balakrishnan Rajagopal terms the hegemonic
nature of human rights discourse in international law. See Balakrishnan Rajagopal, CounterHegemonic International Law: Rethinking Human Rights and Development as a Third World
Strategy, 27 THIRD WORLD Q. 767 (2006).
126.
Chávarro, supra note 16, at 115–24.
127.
Rebecca Bates, The Road to the Well: An Evaluation of the Customary Right to
Water, 19 REV. EUR. COMMUNITY & INT’L ENVTL. L. 282, 293 (2011).
121.
122.
123.
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[c]onsidering the evolution of State practice, national and
international jurisprudence, and the activities of several
international bodies, it is possible to affirm that at least the core
content of the human right to water—that is, the right of everyone
to access to water necessary to respond to his/her basic needs—,
128
has achieved the status of a customary international norm.
Finally, Pierre Thielbörger’s 2015 study, which applies a reflective
equilibrium approach to CIL and is discussed more below, has also found
129
that the right to water has achieved the status of a norm or custom.
Because the existing literature reaches varying conclusions on water as
a human right, what follows is a consideration of whether there is sufficient
evidence to qualify the right as a CIL norm.

1. State Practice
The state practice element of CIL requires the existence of largely
uniform, or consistent, general practice that subsists over a certain
130
duration. To assess state practice for the purpose of identifying a rule of
CIL, it is appropriate to look to, non-exhaustively, states’ internal laws,
municipal court decisions, the practice of their executive branches, their
131
diplomatic practice, and their treaty practice.
Consistency requires near identical state behavior, though minor
divergences do not undermine consistency but are rather regarded as
132
violations of the general rule. Yet state practice concerning the right to

128.
Rhett Larson, The New Right in Water, 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 2181, 2208
(2013) (citing Sara De Vido, The Right to Water as an International Custom: The
Implications in Climate Change Adaptation Measures, 6 CARBON & CLIMATE L. REV. 221,
224–25 (2012)). The pre-2010 scholarship is largely of the view that no CIL right to water had
yet evolved. Amy Hardberger, Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of Water: Evaluating Water as a
Human Right and the Duties and Obligations It Creates, 4 NW. J. INT’L HUMAN RTS. 331,
340, 345 (2005) (“Although global recognition of this need is increasing, it has not reached
the level of customary international law as a separate right.”); Melina Williams, Privatization
and the Human Right to Water: Challenges for the New Century, 28 MICH. J. INT’L L. 469,
502 (2007) (citing DAVID BEDERMAN, INTERNATIONAL LAW FRAMEWORKS 15 (2001))
(arguing that while there may be increasing state recognition of the right to water, one
indication that the right was not yet customary international law was exactly what made the
right so pressing: Many governments failed to ensure access to all citizens, and because
generalized state practice is a necessary element of customary international law, the failure of
state practice impedes the development of customary international law).
129.
Thielbörger, supra note 50, at 239.
130.
JAMES CRAWFORD, BROWNLIE’S PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 24
(2012).
131.
Int’l Law Comm’n, Formation and Evidence of Customary International Law:
Elements in the Previous Work of the International Law Commission That Could be
Particularly Relevant to the Topic, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/659 (Mar. 14, 2013) [hereinafter ILC,
Formation and Evidence of CIL in the Previous Work of the ILC].
132.
WINKLER, supra note 41, at 67.
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water evinces a mixed approach in the actual behavior of states: While some
states provide water as a human right, other states behave as though there is
no such right. The latter states may engage in widespread water
disconnections and have prevailing disparities in water provision amongst
133
members of the public. They may also fail to regulate industrial water use
effectively, resulting in the pollution of the water sources that others depend
134
on, or discriminatorily deprive water to people living in certain regions.
On the other hand, an increasing number of states have inserted a right
135
136
to water into their laws at both the constitutional and statutory levels.
The inclusion of the right to water in state law has the potential to indicate
state practice, “assuming that states . . . fulfil this self-proscribed legal
137
commitment later on in their corresponding policies.”
Catarina de
Albuquerque, “Special Rapporteur on the human right to safe drinking
water and sanitation,” has identified “good practices” of different states,
such as Kenya’s water reforms and Egypt’s water loan system, that may
138
suggest that these states consider water to be a right.
Additionally, one can point to the now superseded Millennium
Development Goals (“MDGs”), specifically MDG 7C, which aimed to
halve the proportion of the global population without sustainable access to
safe drinking water by 2015, as evidence of international recognition of the
139
right. This target was met by the international community in 2010. Today,
the MDGs’ successor, the 2015 Sustainable Development Goals (“SDGs”),

133.
Id., at 68–72 (providing a fuller exposition on state practice as an element of CIL).
134.
Id. at 68.
135.
National constitution provisions that have an explicit enforceable right to water (as
opposed to water as an unenforceable principle of state policy for example) include:
CONSTITUTION, 1996, § 27(a)(b) (S. Afr.); CONSTITUTION, 2010, art. 43(1)(d) (Kenya);
CONSTITUTION, 2013, § 77a (Zimbabwe). In 2004, the Republic of Uruguay constitutionalized
access to potable water as a human right by referendum. See CONSTITUTION, 1967, art. 47
(amended in 2004) (Uruguay). Most recently, the Republic of Slovenia has taken the step of
amending its Constitution to include a right to drinking water in article 70a. See Constitutional
Act Amending Chapter III of the Constitution of the Republic of Slovenia (Nov. 25, 2016)
(Official Gazette of the Republic of Slovenia No. 75/16). For a discussion of the European
position on the right to water, see PIERRE THIELBÖRGER, THE RIGHT(S) TO WATER: THE
MULTI-LEVEL GOVERNANCE OF A UNIQUE HUMAN RIGHT 9 (2014).
136.
For example, section 3(a) and (b) of Namibia’s Water Resource Management Act
of 2013 (Act No. 11 of 2013).
137.
Thielbörger, supra note 50, at 239.
138.
Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent Expert on the Issue of Human
Rights Obligations Related to Access to Safe Drinking Water and Sanitation, Catarina de
Albuquerque, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/15/31 (June 29, 2010); see also THIELBÖRGER, supra note
135, at 9.
139.
UNITED NATIONS, UN Millennium Development Goals, Goal 7: Ensure
Environmental Sustainability, https://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/environ.shtml (last visited
Apr. 6, 2020).
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140

are of greater relevance. SDG 6, in particular, “seeks to ensure availability
and sustainable management of water and sanitation for all,” with the
specific target of achieving universal and equitable access to safe and
141
affordable drinking water for all by 2030. Whether the 2030 objective will
be achieved by states is patently a futuristic determination, but the
commitment alone, while non-binding, would support the notion that states
are actively pursuing water access for all.
One can arguably also invoke the existence of official multilateral
instruments, such as declarations and resolutions, to substantiate the
existence of state practice. However, to avoid what scholars Bruno Simma
and Philip Alston cautioned against as “the tendency to ‘count’ the
articulation of a rule twice, so to speak, not only as an expression of opinio
142
juris but also as State practice itself,” official state documents such as
UNGA resolutions will only be considered herein as evidence of opinio
juris, below.
On balance, the evidence considered here, in agreement with the more
143
rigorous scholarly assessments of the element, suggests that existing state
practice remains insufficient to uphold a CIL right to water given the limited
actual behavior of states in support of that right.

2. Opinio Juris
The second element of CIL is opinio iuris sive necessitates, which only
permits state practice to be regarded as evidence of an international norm
where states perceive a legal obligation for following the norm that
144
distinguishes it from mere usage. Sources that can be invoked as evidence
of opinio juris include public statements made on behalf of states, official
publications, government legal opinions, diplomatic correspondences,
decisions of state courts, treaty provisions, and conduct in connection with
resolutions adopted by an international organization or at an
145
intergovernmental conference. Thus, while UNGA resolutions, unlike UN
Security Council resolutions, do not attract the binding force of law, they

140.
UNITED NATIONS, UN Sustainable Development Goals, Transforming Our World:
the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/
post2015/transformingourworld (last visited Apr. 6, 2020); Inga Winkler & Carmel Williams,
The Sustainable Development Goals and Human Rights: A Critical Early Review, 21 INT’L J.
HUM. RTS. 1023 (2017).
141.
UNITED NATIONS, UN Sustainable Development Goals, Goal 6: Ensure Access to
Water and Sanitation for All, https://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/water-andsanitation (last visited Apr. 6, 2020).
142.
Bruno Simma & Philip Alston, The Sources of Human Rights Law: Custom, Jus
Cogens, and General Principles, 12 AUSTL. Y.B. OF INT’L L. 82, 96 (1988).
143.
Thielbörger, supra note 50, at 239; WINKLER, supra note 41, at 69.
144.
ILC, Formation and Evidence of CIL in the Previous Work of the ILC, supra note
131.
145.
Id.
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may retain normative value in establishing the existence of a rule or the
146
emergence of opinio juris. The following assessment, reviewing the
plethora of multilateral declarations, resolutions, and other state-centric
documents to that effect, reveals a strong basis for the existence of the
opinio juris supporting a right to water, which is a view almost unanimously
147
held by scholars who have considered the right to water to be a CIL norm.
Opinio juris supporting a CIL right to water has been developing since
the 1977 UN Conference on Water in the Argentinian city of Mar del Plata,
where the Conference reported that: “All peoples . . . have the right to have
access to drinking water in quantities and of a quality equal to their basic
148
needs.” More recently, the General Assembly asserted the right to water
149
in the 2010 UNGA Resolution 64/292.
It is important to closely critique Resolution 64/292 given not only its
probative value but also the significant weight that scholars attach to it in
examining a CIL right to water. The material language in UNGA Resolution
64/292 “recognizes” that “the right to safe and clean drinking water and
sanitation is a human right that is essential for the full enjoyment of life and
150
all human rights.” This language (“recognizes” as opposed to “declares”)
clarifies that the UNGA does not lay claim to discovering the right to water
151
but only affirms its existence.

146.
See Consequences of the Separation of the Chagos Archipelago from Mauritius in
1965, Advisory Opinion, 2019 I.C.J. 169, ¶ 155 (Feb. 25) [hereinafter ICJ Advisory Opinion
on the Chagos Archipelago]; Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory
Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 226, ¶ 70 (July 8) [hereinafter ICJ Opinion on the Legality of the Use or
Threat of Nuclear Weapons]. For a comprehensive discussion of UN General Assembly
[“UNGA”] resolutions and their legal effects, see Marko Öberg, The Legal Effects of
Resolutions of the UN Security Council and General Assembly in the Jurisprudence of the
ICJ, 16 EUR. J. INT’L L. 879, 879–905 (2005); Cedric Ryngaert & Duco Siccama,
Ascertaining Customary International Law: An Inquiry Into the Methods Used by Domestic
Courts, 65 NETH. INT’L L. REV. 1, 10 (2018) (noting that the ICJ has the habit of regarding
non-binding instruments such as UNGA resolutions as, under some circumstances, reflecting
CIL, without much analysis of its own).
147.
For a historical account of the evolution of the right to water since the 1970s, see
SALMAN M.A. SALMAN & SIOBHAN MCLNERNEY-LANKFORD, THE HUMAN RIGHT TO
WATER: LEGAL AND POLICY DIMENSIONS 7 (2004), and for a historical overview of the
conferences, declarations, and resolutions on water since 1977, see WORLD WATER COUNCIL,
History, http://www.worldwatercouncil.org/en/history (last visited Apr. 6, 2020); WINKLER,
supra note 41, at 79–87; Thielbörger, supra note 50, at 240; Christy Clark, Of What Use Is a
Deradicalized Human Right to Water?, 17 HUM. RTS. L. REV. 231, 242 (2017) (critiquing
social movements for water rights in relation to water as an economic good).
148.
UN Water Conference, Report of the United Nations Water Conference, Mar del
Plata, U.N. Doc. E/CONF.70/29, at 66 (1977).
149.
G.A. Res. 64/292, supra note 80.
150.
Id. ¶ 1.
151.
See THIELBÖRGER, supra note 137, at 79–81 (stating that the word “declares” was
at the eleventh hour replaced with “recognizes,” which to him suggests that the drafters
acknowledged that a UNGA resolution could not “declare” a new right due to its non-binding
nature, but could at most “recognize” an already existing right).
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One hundred and twenty-two states voted in favor of the Resolution
with no states voting against; forty-one states abstained and twenty-nine
152
states were absent. While no objections were recorded, this high number
of abstentions and absenteeism casts doubt over the assertion that the
153
Resolution reflects a shared opinio juris.
To reflect opinio juris,
multilateral declarations ordinarily require proof of consensus through a
154
higher number of positive votes. In its advisory opinion in Legality of the
Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, for example, the ICJ determined that
specific UNGA resolutions fell short of establishing the existence of an
opinio juris on the illegality of the use of nuclear weapons, considering the
155
“substantial numbers of negative votes and abstentions.”
Still, the ICJ noted that UNGA resolutions “may sometimes have
normative value. . . . provid[ing] evidence important for establishing the
existence of a rule or the emergence of an opinio juris,” and necessitating a
156
“look at its content and the conditions of its adoption.” The 2010 UNGA
157
Resolution was promptly followed by further UNGA Resolutions in 2013
158
and 2015, both of which recalled and effectively reaffirmed the 2010
UNGA Resolution. Additionally, the UNHRC adopted two further
159
160
resolutions in 2010 and 2011 that also reaffirmed the 2010 UNGA
Resolution. When considered in isolation, each of these UNHRC resolutions
would be of limited weight as evidence of shared opinio juris on the right to
water, as only 47 states are members of the UNHRC at any given time
161
whereas the UN membership is at 193 states. Nonetheless, collectively,

152.
See Press Release, General Assembly, General Assembly Adopts Resolution
Recognizing Access to Clean Water, Sanitation as Human Right, by Recorded Vote of 122 in
Favour, None Against, 41 Abstentions, U.N. Press Release GA/10967 (July 28, 2010). For an
elaborate discussion of the context of the vote and its (in)significance, see WINKLER, supra
note 41, at 76–79; Thielbörger, supra note 50, at 241; Tully, supra note 70.
153.
Clark states that the reason for the considerably high number of abstentions is
because of the politics underlying the introduction of the resolution, which was sponsored by
Bolivia. Clark, supra note 147, at 244–45. Some states held the belief that it would have been
more appropriate to wait for the UN HRC to complete its formal development of a substantive
interpretation of the right. Id.
154.
THIELBÖRGER, supra note 137, at 80.
155.
ICJ Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the Use or Threat of Nuclear Weapons, at
71.
156.
Id., at 70.
157.
G.A. Res. 68/157, The Human Right to Water and Sanitation, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/68/157 (Dec. 18, 2013) (adopted without a vote).
158.
G.A. Res. 70/169, The Human Right to Water and Sanitation (Dec. 17, 2015).
159.
Human Rights Council Res. 15/9, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/RES/15/9, ¶ 3 (Sep. 30,
2013).
160.
Human Rights Council Res. 16/2, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/RES/16/2, ¶ 1 (Mar. 24,
2011).
161.
See generally Thielbörger, supra note 50, at 241 (explaining the U.N. HRC’s
Resolution in greater detail).
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there exists a sufficient amount of opinio juris to make a case for the CIL
right to water.

C. Evaluating the Presence of CIL in Light of Methodological Theories
In light of the finding in section A that there is limited state practice
supporting a CIL right to water, can one credibly assert the existence of
water as a customary rule? Scholars claiming that CIL is nevertheless
present rely on different methods for determining how the two CIL elements
interact to crystallize into norms of custom than those who conclude it is not
present. A consistent method, particularly at the ICJ level, to facilitate legal
162
certainty has thus far proved elusive. For instance, Stephan Talmon’s
landmark study on the methodology for determining rules of CIL found that
the ICJ has not used one single methodology but rather a mixture of
163
methodologies: induction, deduction and, the main method, assertion.
While this paper is not specifically concerned with the abstract question of
how CIL should be identified, the question of methodology is unavoidable
in determining whether the right to water is a CIL norm.
The importance of applying a cogent, clear, and rigorous legal
methodology for identifying CIL is aptly summed up by Theodor Meron,
who cautions against the “tendencies, apparent in various fields of
international law, to impose treaty norms on non-parties in the guise of
general international law or customary law, even in the absence of state
164
practice dehors the treaty.” This, Meron laments, risks the “credibility of
international human rights,” thereby requiring that consistent and
“irreproachable” legal methods be utilized when attempting to “extend the
165
universality” of international human rights norms.
With this caution in mind, this article considers two approaches to
determining whether a CIL right to water has crystallized: the sliding scale
and reflective equilibrium approaches. While these two approaches are not
166
the only approaches that have been developed in the identification of CIL,

162.
Nadia Banteka, A Theory of Constructive Interpretation for Customary
International Law Identification, 39 MICH. J. INT’L L. 301, 302 (2018).
163.
Stephan Talmon, Determining Customary International Law: The ICJ’s
Methodology Between Induction, Deduction and Assertion, 26 EUR. J. INT’L L. 417 (2015).
Concisely put, induction is a method of inferring the customary norm from an iterative
process of state practice and opinio juris. Deduction infers a specific customary norm from a
more general principle. Assertion means that the ICJ neither uses inductive nor deductive
reasoning, but simply asserts a norm as customary international law. Id.; see also Stephen
Choi & Mitu Gulati, Customary International Law: How Do Courts Do It?, in CUSTOM’S
FUTURE: INTERNATIONAL LAW IN A CHANGING WORLD 117 (Curtis Bradley ed., 2016).
164.
THEODOR MERON, HUMAN RIGHTS AND HUMANITARIAN NORMS AS CUSTOMARY
LAW 81 (1989).
165.
Id.
166.
Compare, for example, the constructive interpretation theory advanced by Nadia
Banteka, which invokes the Dworkinian constructive interpretation approach; not viewing the
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they are both especially applicable to the case at hand, as they were each
developed to test the presence of CIL when one CIL element is lopsided in
relation to another.

1. Kirgis’s Sliding Scale Approach
In assessing the existence of CIL norms generally, significant
discrepancies between the existence of state practice and opinio juris are
often revealed. In a prominent example from 1986, the ICJ in Nicaragua
was faced with significant evidence of a state practice of state intervention
in the internal affairs of other states, while at the same time, there existed
strong and, seemingly opposing, opinio juris supporting an obligation of
non-intervention. To explain this paradox, Fredrick Kirgis engaged the
167
metaphor of a “sliding scale”: One element of custom can compensate for
the other, weaker element or, in the extreme case, an element can become
168
entirely dispensable if the other element is of sufficient strength.
Under the sliding scale approach, state practice that is very frequent and
consistent would establish a CIL rule even “without much (or any)
affirmative showing of an opinio juris so long as it is not negated by
169
evidence of non-normative intent.” Therefore, “[a]s the frequency and
consistency of the practice decline in any series of cases, a stronger showing
170
of an opinio juris is required.”
Kirgis asserted that at the other end of the scale, “a clearly
demonstrated opinio juris establishes a customary rule without much (or
any) affirmative showing that governments are consistently behaving in
171
accordance with the asserted rule.” The exact amount of state practice that
would be a substitute for opinio juris and how clear a showing of opinio
juris will substitute for consistent behavior depends on “the activity in
172
question and on the reasonableness of the asserted customary rule.”
Kirgis further found that the more destabilizing or morally distasteful
the activity—for example, the offensive use of force or the deprivation of
fundamental human rights—the more readily international decision makers
will substitute one element for the other, provided that the asserted rule
seems reasonable.

two elements of CIL as strictly divided into a binary, but instead viewing them as interwoven.
The goal of constructive interpretation is to impose purpose on a practice in order to put it in
the best possible light within the constraints of its factual history and shape. Banteka, supra
note 162, at 301.
167.
Frederic Kirgis, Custom on a Sliding Scale, 81 AM. J. INT’L L. 146, 146 (1987).
168.
Id. at 149.
169.
Id.
170.
Id.
171.
Id.
172.
Id.
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The principal disquiet with the sliding scale approach is that it can
justify totally dispensing with state practice as a CIL element where strong
opinio juris exists. Recall that article 38(1)(b) ICJ Statute requires evidence
173
of (1) general practice that is (2) accepted as law. Scholars are uneasy
imagining “customary law without custom,” as Neils Petersen succinctly
174
puts it, as this appears to disregard the intrinsic limitations presented by
the text of article 38(1)(b) “in order to accommodate a desired (and highly
175
admirable) policy outcome.” In this context, Blutman cites Kirgis’s CIL
methodology approach, amongst others, in cautioning against “dubious
dichotomies in describing the operation of customary norms in order to get
176
round the difficulties posed by sophisticated reconciliation theories.”
Consequently, many of the “most highly qualified publicists” to invoke the
language of article 38(1)(d) ICJ Statute also continue to view both elements
177
as indispensable for a CIL norm to exist.
Nevertheless, even though Kirgis’s approach may be deemed
antiquated, the ICJ’s approach to CIL continues to place greater weight
upon opinio juris in identifying CIL than on state practice, and the 2019
178
Chagos Archipelago advisory opinion by the ICJ evinces this approach. In
the context of the right to water, embracing the sliding scale approach
would not result in the complete dispensability of the state practice element
(as some state practice does exist) but would only require the strength of
opinio juris to compensate for the shortfall in state practice.

2. Thielbörger’s Reflective Equilibrium Approach
The second approach to determining the presence of a CIL norm,
despite an imbalance between the presence of state practice and of opinio
juris, is that advanced by Pierre Thielbörger. Thielbörger specifically
examined the right to water as a CIL norm and found the state practice
179
element wanting, while opinio juris is sufficient. To overcome the
insufficiency in state practice, Thielbörger innovatively adopted a “modern”
approach to establishing CIL. Thielbörger’s approach draws on Anthea
Roberts’s original distinction between traditional and modern approaches to
180
CIL, which argues that, in the context of the ICJ’s jurisprudence,
173.
Simma & Alston, supra note 142, at 83.
174.
Niels Petersen, Customary Law Without Custom? Rules, Principles, and the Role of
State Practice in International Norm Creation, 23 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 275, 284 (2008).
175.
Id. at 96.
176.
László Blutman, Conceptual Confusion and Methodological Deficiencies: Some
Ways That Theories on Customary International Law Fail, 25 EUR. J. INT’L L. 529, 548
(2014).
177.
Thielbörger, supra note 50, at 235.
178.
ICJ Advisory Opinion on the Chagos Archipelago, supra note 146, at 155.
179.
Thielbörger, supra note 50.
180.
Anthea Roberts, Traditional and Modern Approaches to Customary International
Law: A Reconciliation, 95 AM. J. INT’L L. 757 (2001).
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traditional approaches to CIL emphasize general, consistent state practice,
181
leaving opinio juris as an inferior second step. In contrast, modern
approaches to CIL emphasize opinio juris as the decisive element for
identifying custom, starting with examining general statements of rules,
182
rather than specific state practices, which take a secondary role.
In many ways, Thielbörger’s argument for a reflective equilibrium
approach to CIL is an appeal to lex ferenda (law as it “ought” to be), which
remains some distance from lex lata (law as it “is”). In order to overcome
the lack of sufficient, uniform state practice to support a CIL right to water,
183
Thielbörger has recourse to Roberts’s theory of reflective equilibrium, a
theory that Roberts in turn developed through the work of John Rawls.
Succinctly put, under reflective equilibrium “a strong opinio juris would
become crucial under the condition that state practice is strong enough to
184
allow for different interpretations.” However, Thielbörger emphasizes that
this approach does not mean that state practice is irrelevant to the
assessment, as would be the case in Kirgis’s sliding scale approach to CIL
185
assessed earlier.
Reflective equilibrium ultimately allows the existence of strong opinio
juris to compensate for the inconclusive state practice that evinces water as
186
a human right. As such, Thielbörger concludes that the right to water has
attained the status of a CIL norm. However, Thielbörger’s recourse to
Roberts’s
reflective
equilibrium
approach—notwithstanding
its
innovativeness—till leaves the right to water’s legal basis under CIL
tenuous at best.
First, it invites the same criticism that applies to the sliding scale
approach above: It re-interprets and re-shapes the elements of CIL towards a
187
particular result. Therefore, an embrace of the reflective equilibrium
approach would risk perpetuating the critique that CIL “cannot function as a
legitimate source of substantive legal norms in a decentralized world of
188
nations that lacks a broad sense of shared values.”
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Indian Territory (Port. v. India), 1960 I.C.J. Rep. 6, at 42–43 (Apr. 12).
182.
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establish a CIL rule against the use of force and the principle of non-intervention, with limited
references to state practice. See Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua
(Nicar. v. U.S.), Judgment, 1984 I.C.J. 14, at 195 (June 26).
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Second, valuing opinio juris above state practice, such that state
practice need not be absolute in order for CIL to form, presents the
normative challenge of alowing the practice of some states to determine
what is or is not CIL. Framed differently, it manifests hegemony and biases
based on geographic, economic, and political power. Such an understanding
of CIL risks regressing to forms of international law-making that were seen
during the colonial period—when recourse to the practices of only a handful
189
of (western) states for the formation of CIL was replete. The latent
problems that would arise from reinforcing the role of opinio juris while
downgrading that of state practice are laid bare by scholars George Galindo
and Cesar Yip when they opine that:
Making customary international law exclusively an expression of a
certain opinio juris is dangerous in many respects, especially
because the practice of states can effectively play a role of
protecting the interests of Third World states against the will of
Great Powers. But the tendency of international courts to
emphasize the role of opinio juris is even more dangerous when it
represents the opinion of a single set of judges under the disguise of
190
states’ opinio juris.
Therefore, Thielbörger’s theory of reflective equilibrium is also not an
irreproachable legal method for identifying the existence of the right to
water as a CIL norm.

D. The Right to Water as a CIL Norm qua the UDHR?
A road less travelled in the literature is to advance a right to water under
CIL by drawing on the authority of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights (“UDHR”), without specifically evaluating state practice or opinio
juris. In particular, the right to a standard of living adequate for well-being
191
192
in article 25(1) UDHR has been invoked to imply the right to water. The
normative justifications for implying a right to water under the UDHR
mirror those advanced under article 11(1) ICESCR, discussed earlier:
189.
George Galindo & Cesar Yip, Customary International Law and the Third World:
Do Not Step on the Grass, 16 CHINESE J. INT’L L. 251, 254 (2017); Rajagopal, supra note
125, at 767; see also Tiyanjana Maluwa, Reassessing Aspects of the Contribution of African
States to the Development of International Law Through African Regional Multilateral
Treaties, 41 MICH. J. INT’L L. 327 (2020) (collecting sources considering similar issues in the
context of both treaty law and custom before evaluating modern African contributions to
international treaty law).
190.
Galindo and Yip, supra note 189, at 261.
191.
G.A. Res. 217(III)A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights art. 25 (Dec. 10,
1948) (“Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-being
of himself and of his family, including food, clothing, housing and medical care and necessary
social services, and the right to security in the event of unemployment, sickness, disability,
widowhood, old age or other lack of livelihood in circumstances beyond his control.”).
192.
Copp, supra note 60, at 252.
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Access to water is fundamental for sustaining life and the minimum that is
required to participate in social life with dignity.
However, this legal basis for the right to water in CIL depends on the
assumption that the UDHR en bloc reflects CIL. That premise is untenable,
despite receiving support internationally. For example, the view that the
193
UDHR is CIL has been asserted judicially, by the ICJ and the African
194
195
Court of Human and Peoples’ Rights, and quasi-judicially. Some
scholars also consider the UDHR to be automatically binding because it
196
represents the consensus of the international community. Yet, while the
argument for the UDHR’s authority as CIL has support, it is difficult to
countenance an approach where courts assert the existence of CIL norms by
broad-brushingly categorizing a non-binding, UNGA declaratory instrument
as CIL without any meaningful attempt at applying the established elements
to identify CIL, let alone engaging CIL methodology. And, given the
significant methodological disagreement the preceding discussion reveals, it
does not seem likely that the UDHR would be considered CIL under that
kind of painstaking legal analysis.
In the final analysis, this article has determined that there is no CIL
197
right to water. The right remains an idea whose time has not yet come. At
best, in the CIL context, the rule can be regarded as statu nascendi, an
198
emerging rule of custom that is yet to fully crystalize into a CIL norm. Of
course, the assertion of statu nascendi itself assumes that the effluxion of
time will necessarily see the CIL norm’s “crystallization” rather than “decrystallization.” This seems to be a fair assumption, as there is
overwhelming state consensus of a right to water as a matter of opinio juris.
This consensus is not insignificant; the non-binding documents conveying
this consensus can serve as meaningful resources in interpreting and
determining the normative content of a treaty-based right to water.
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IV. The Significance of General Principles of Law in the
Right to Water Debate
The third of the three principal sources of international law under article
199
38(1)(c) of the ICJ Statute is “the general principles of law recognised by
200
civilised nations.” This source, too, may arguably be of relevance to
201
water’s status as a legally binding human right. General principles of law,
like CIL and treaties, can function as a direct source of rights and
202
obligations. It is widely accepted that general principles of law, like CIL,
would bind all states. In fact, there is no indication of any a priori hierarchy
203
among the three formal sources listed in article 38(1). Nevertheless, some
scholars claim that general principles of law constitute a “secondary” source
204
with the main function of “filling gaps” in the absence of a treaty or CIL
205
norm.
Partly given their unwritten character, the determination of general
principles of law remains a controversy in international law. Whether
general principles may be drawn from a comparison of domestic law,
206
international law, or global legal systems, and what the methodology for
207
defining a general principle should be, is contested. This article adopts the
199.
ICJ Statute art. 38(1). For a comprehensive assessment and characterization of the
key controversies around general principles of law as a source of international law, see Int’l
Law Comm’n, Rep. of the Int’l Law Comm’n in its Sixty-Ninth Session, U.N. Doc. A/72/10,
at 224 (2017) (Special Representative Marcelo Vásquez-Bermúdez).
200.
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international law, . . . is the legacy of the period, now passed away, of colonialism.
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widely accepted view advanced by Catherine Redgwell that general
principles, in the sense of article 381(1)(c), may be derived from both
208
domestic law and international law.
Simma and Alston advocate for a greater grounding of the legality of
209
human rights norms in general principles of law. This view has also been
supported by the ICJ in the South West Africa cases, where Justice Tanaka,
in his dissent, found equality and non-discrimination to be fundamental
human rights norms, stating that “the concept of human rights and of their
210
protection is included in the general principles in Article 38(1)(c).” Yet, in
the right to water discourse, the role of general principles of continues to
receive sparse consideration.
Finding a right to water in general principles would ensure the right has
211
a strong grounding in the “consensualist conception” of international law,
with significant implications on at least two fronts. First, as a general
principle of law, the right to water would be binding upon all states and not
just treaty-contracting States Parties. Second, even if the right to water is not
itself a general principle, existing general principles may be invoked to
scope out the normative content of a right to water that is established under
domestic law (such as a constitution), under treaty law, or under CIL.
In assessing the existence of the right to water as a general principle of
law, it indeed is significant that some states have incorporated a right to
212
water in their national constitutions. However, as argued in the earlier
assessment of the state practice element of CIL, and as reflected in the
preponderance of scholarship on the issue, the number of states is not
sufficiently widespread and the practice not sufficiently common to the
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213

representative legal systems of the world to constitute a general principle
214
of law that affirms the right to water.
Nevertheless, the lack of a general principle of law supporting the right
to water does not necessarily mean that general principles are irrelevant to
the debate over whether there is a right to water, which brings us to the
second reason to assess general principles. General principles could be of
relevance in defining the content, and determining the obligations that
attach to, a right to water that is established as a matter of domestic law,
treaty law, or—assuming such exists—CIL. The right to water’s character
as a general principle may well be acknowledged and reflected in treaties
such as the ICESCR or ICCPR. This is particularly pertinent in light of the
reality that a soft law instrument—General Comment 15—enunciates the
substance of what the right to water would entail, including its normative
215
216
content,
principles of non-discrimination and equality,
and the
217
correlative general and core obligations of State Parties. However,
General Comment 15’s soft law, non-binding nature limits reliance upon it,
given its questionable legitimacy.
General principles of law may thus be utilised to offer universally
binding law that would define those minimum social standards, particularly
in terms of the positive and negative obligations of states qua access and
provision of water as a right. In particular, the general principles of law
already found in international environmental law would be of potential
application given the heavily environmentally-laden concerns that water
access, provision, and security would give rise to. For instance, the
precautionary principle, would, in the water context, impose obligations of
diligent prevention and control of foreseeable risks to the pollution of water
218
sources.

V. Conclusions
Access to water will no doubt remain one of the most vexing global
concerns in the decades to come. From the 2.1 billion people who lack
access to safely managed drinking water services, to those whose water
sources will be increasingly precarious due to the effects of climate change,
pollution, and industrial over-abstraction, the consequences are potentially
213.
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214.
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215.
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219

life-threatening. In addressing these challenges, multilateralism ought to
inform global efforts. As such, international law offers potential for
common norms for states.
This article has thus sought to unmuddy the waters on the status of the
right to water under international law by evaluating the right’s existence
under each of the three principal sources of international law. While water’s
status as an express human right has been affirmed under treaty law, it is
limited to the context of specific, protected categories of persons such as
women, children, and the disabled. With the aid of the implied rights
doctrine, the ICESCR and ICCPR offer a freestanding human right to water
of general application, but this right is not explicit and may therefore be
debated. Non-treaty-based sources of a right to water—CIL and the general
principles of law—could extend the right to water to non-treaty parties.
However, limited state practice restricts the conception of water as a right
under CIL, and the fate of the right to water as a CIL norm may remain
unsettled until the broader controversy around the appropriate methodology
for identifying CIL is settled. The right to water is also not supported as a
general principle of law. Nonetheless, an ongoing conversation about how
general principles of law support a right to water is valuable, as it can assist
the determination of the nature and content of states’ positive and negative
obligations regarding the minimum social standards qua access and
provision of water as a human right.
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